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THE
**TERRORISM
LECTURES**

2nd Edition

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TERRORISM
LECTURES

2nd Edition

A Comprehensive Collection for Students
of Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and National Security

JAMES J.F. FOREST

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Publisher's Note: *The cover photo was chosen to commemorate the 20th anniversary of one of the most tragic terrorist attacks in U.S. history. On April 19, 1995, right-wing extremist Timothy McVeigh detonated a truck bomb outside the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, killing 168 people and injuring hundreds more.*

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As this revised and expanded Second Edition of my lectures book goes to press, I am reminded ever more about the debt of gratitude I owe to so many people who contributed to my own understanding of terrorism. Indeed, it has taken many years, and the contribution of many people, to make a book like this possible. When I first began teaching courses on terrorism at West Point many years ago, I knew only a fraction of what I know today. Thankfully, I was guided in my journey of learning by several pillars of the terrorism studies field, including senior colleagues at the Combating Terrorism Center (CTC): General (ret.) Wayne Downing, Distinguished Chair; Professor Bruce Hoffman, Senior Fellow; Ambassador Michael Sheehan, Senior Fellow; and most especially Brigadier General (ret.) Russ Howard, Founding Director of the CTC and Head of the Social Sciences Department at West Point. After General Downing's untimely passing, General (ret.) John Abizaid accepted the position of Distinguished Chair at the CTC, and his leadership helped elevate the Center to new heights.

Just like many young academics, I studied the works of the world's most respected international experts in the field, like Martha Crenshaw, Brian Jenkins, Alex Schmid, Leonard Weinberg and David Rapoport. Over the course of the last decade, I have had the privilege of professionally collaborating with each of them, and I thank them for their indulgence and encouragement. Of course, my colleagues and friends at West Point were instrumental in expanding my learning about terrorism and counterterrorism, and none more so than Jarret Brachman, Assaf Moghadam, Colonel Joe Felter, Colonel Kip McCormick, Colonel Scott Womack, Colonel Cindy Jebb, Colonel Isaiah (Ike) Wilson, Colonel Suzanne Nielsen, Lieutenant Colonel

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Throughout this professional journey, a great many colleagues and friends at other institutions have also been vital to developing my understanding of terrorism, and I must take the opportunity here to thank Jennifer Giroux, Matthew Levitt, Erica Chenoweth, David Kilcullen, Peter Neumann, Vera Eccarius-Kelly, Annette Idler, Alex Schmid, Richard Shultz, Max Abrahms, Gary Ackerman, Victor Asal, Arie Perliger, Ami Pedahzur, Vanda Felbab-Brown, Gabriel Weiman, Magnus Ranstorp, Paul Pillar, Robert Wesley, Joshua Sinai, Tom Marks, James Smith and no doubt hundreds more whom I have sadly overlooked at the moment. And certainly this adventure would have been possible without the generosity, twelve years ago, of people like Vincent Viola, Rob Andy, George Gilmore III, and Ross Perot, whose financial support of the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point was absolutely critical.

The adventure continues today at the Center for Terrorism and Security Studies at the University of Massachusetts Lowell, where I am most grateful to work with and learn from world-renowned scholars like Professors John Horgan and Mia Bloom, as well as emerging scholars like Joel Day, Paul Joosse, Neil Shortland and Suzzette Abbasciano. Robert Kerins, a doctoral student whom I have worked closely with during the past two years, provided very helpful suggestions for editing and revising this book. And of course, I owe a great deal of thanks to Professor Eve Buzawa for all her tireless efforts leading our department and the School of Criminology and Justice Studies.

Finally, I share my deepest gratitude to my family for their enduring support and encouragement: my father, my four brothers and sister, my wife Alicia and my two amazing children Chloe and Jackson, all of whom have provided years of encouragement and hope. And as I explained in the acknowledgments to the first edition of this book (published in 2012), these lectures are dedicated to my mother, Jeri Lynn Mallard, who died of cancer when she was 37 years old. All of her children remain inspired by her commitment to family, education, serving her community, and improving the world around us.

PREFACE

If you have seen other books on terrorism, you might be asking yourself, “Okay, what’s unique about this one?” Here’s my ten-second response: This book is meant to simulate the experience of a semester-long university course on terrorism. Each chapter represents what is meant to be a 35- to 40-minute classroom lecture.

That’s it, in a nutshell. If terrorism is in fact something of interest to you, my intent has been to make this collection of lectures informative, engaging and accessible to a general readership.* Perhaps it will also be helpful to some of my friends and colleagues who teach their own courses on terrorism. Each chapter provides a short list of “questions for discussions”—in addition to fostering classroom interaction, these could also be useful for short paper assignments or midterm exam questions. Also, the final lecture in this series offers several questions about the future of terrorism, which could also be used for course assignments (final exam questions, research papers, etc.) There might even be some useful nuggets in here for researchers and scholars of terrorism studies, policymakers, congressional staffers, military and intelligence officers, newspaper editors, Hollywood scriptwriters, and my Grandpa Lou.

I imagine the next question you may have is something like, “Well then, who is this guy, and why should I want to read his lectures?” Good question; still trying to figure that one out myself. Officially, I’m a professor and director of the Security Studies graduate program at the University of Massachusetts Lowell, and I serve as a senior fellow at the Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) at MacDill Air Force Base in Tampa, Florida, where I hold a security clearance and work on research and other initiatives. I previously spent nine years on the faculty of the United States

* If you are interested strictly in the topic of *combating* terrorism, please note that a separate volume of my lectures on counterterrorism strategies and tactics will be published at a later date.

Military Academy (2001-2010). During six of those years, I served as Director of Terrorism Studies within the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, originally led by Colonel (now Brigadier General, retired) Russell Howard, a U.S. Special Forces officer and Head of the Social Sciences Department. Retired four-star General Wayne Downing, formerly a Commander-in-Chief of U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) and a Special Advisor to the President for Counterterrorism, served as our Distinguished Chair until his sudden and tragic passing in July 2007. During my last few years there, the Center was led by Colonel Mike Meese, Head of the Social Sciences Department, and retired four-star General John Abizaid served as our Distinguished Chair. If you're not familiar with the Center, please take a look at the website (<http://www.ctc.usma.edu>). It truly is a terrific institution.


While a good deal of time was spent teaching courses on international relations, terrorism, counterterrorism, information warfare, weapons of mass destruction, and so forth, I was also able to publish nine books and many articles that have hopefully been useful to colleagues and professionals in the field. Other highlights of those years include being invited to give testimony at a U.S. Senate subcommittee hearing on countering violent extremism; giving keynote addresses and speeches at events for senior NATO officers, FBI field office supervisors, and the Department of the Army; and lecturing at the University of St. Andrews, University of Haifa, Harvard University, and the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, among other institutions. At one point, I found myself on a stage in Zurich, Switzerland giving a speech at an international security conference alongside John Brennan, who later became President Obama's chief Advisor for Counterterrorism and more recently served as the Director of the CIA. And I'll never forget meeting with then-Rear Admiral Bill McRaven in Germany while conducting research at Special Operations Command-Africa.

As part of a multi-year collaboration between the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point and the FBI Deputy Director for Counterterrorism, I developed a new textbook on terrorism that was subsequently adopted for their New Agent Training program in Quantico, and then I traveled to various parts of the United States giving talks at Joint Terrorism Task Force seminars. I also accompanied groups of West Point cadets on visits to the White House, National Counterterrorism Center, State Department, and Directorate of National Intelligence. Overall, when I look back at nearly a decade on the faculty at West Point, it certainly was a wild and fantastic adventure, one that I will always cherish fondly.

Within the past few years, I've been privileged to collaborate with world-renowned scholars like Professors John Horgan and Mia Bloom in the Center for Terrorism and Security Studies at the University of Massachusetts Lowell. Professor Emeritus Alex Schmid and I are now sharing duties as co-editors of the internationally-acclaimed scholarly journal *Perspectives on Terrorism*. I've had opportunities to give lectures at the National Intelligence University, JSOU, and various events for senior U.S. military and NATO officers. In 2010 I was able to spend time in Nigeria conducting research on Boko Haram, and visited Senegal in 2011 to study the political and security challenges they are facing in that country. And in 2013 I spent some time in Uganda to study counterterrorism lessons that can be drawn from the recent cooperation between U.S. Special Operations Forces and regional militaries in tracking down Joseph Kony and his murderous followers in the Lord's Resistance Army. Reports produced from those research trips are publicly available at the JSOU publications website.

Overall, I've been studying, writing and lecturing about terrorism and counterterrorism for the bulk of my professional career. And yet, I still consider myself a student of this field. There is so much to learn, so many things to understand about the complex phenomenon we call terrorism, and the ways in which we can confront it more successfully. For my part, I plan to keep working in this field for many years to come. The lectures contained in this book will hopefully encourage and inspire some of you to do the same.

James J.F. Forest
Roberts Cove, NH
May 2015



DEFINITIONS AND HISTORICAL FRAMEWORKS

1

AN INTRODUCTION TO TERRORISM

Terms, Definitions, and the Quest for Power

Welcome to the first lecture in the series on terrorism. We begin with a look at the definition of terrorism. Terrorists are crazy dudes blowing stuff up. Well, that's not entirely accurate, is it? In truth, terrorism is a complex phenomenon that has been studied and debated for several decades. Further, there are many competing definitions of the term *terrorism*, not only among scholars but also among policymakers and government agencies. For example, from the U.S. Department of State's view the term terrorism means "premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience."¹ Meanwhile, the Department of Justice defines terrorism as "the unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a Government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives."² The distinction that the Department of State makes in referring to "politically motivated violence" is an important one, as terrorism is often described as a form of collective violence that is politically motivated.

These political motivations vary across a broad spectrum. Many terrorist groups have pursued goals of revolution, establishing a geopolitically separate identity (often referred to as ethnonational self-determination, or national independence), the cessation of animal testing by groups such as the Animal Liberation Front (ALF), or deforestation, on the part of the Earth Liberation Front (ELF); or even religiously-oriented goals like outlawing abortion, or subjugating members of another faith—goals which are still related to politics and power.³ The challenge of finding a common definition of terrorism has been illustrated most prominently by

decades of debate at the United Nations. For instance, while the United States and Western European nations usually endorse Israel's definition of Palestinian suicide bombers as terrorists, there are many Arab nations in the Middle East who support the Palestinians' cause, and argue that they are "freedom fighters" (another term used within the genre of political violence), or use some other more benign label.

We have seen similar debates at a local level as well. Catholics in Northern Ireland who refused to call the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) terrorists, and Protestants in Northern Ireland who refused to call the Ulster Defence Association (UDA) or Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) terrorists, when all these groups have clearly been responsible for significant terrorist violence throughout the past half century. The definitional debate has led some to suggest that terrorism should be considered a matter of perception. However, I personally believe that freedom fighters or insurgents can certainly attempt to achieve their political objectives without resorting to terrorism.

Essentially, those of us who study terrorism have a variety of definitions to choose from. According to the eminent political scientist David Rapoport, "Terror is violence with distinctive properties used for political purposes both by private parties and states. That violence is unregulated by publicly accepted norms to contain violence, the rules of war, and the rules of punishment. Private groups using terror most often disregard the rules of war, while state terror generally disregards legally codified rules of punishment, i.e. those enabling us to distinguish guilt from innocence. But both states and non-state groups can ignore either set of rules."⁴ Louise Richardson, another scholar whom I admire, explains that terrorist organizations have a political objective that they seek to obtain through violence or the threat of violence, and that the use of this violence is not to defeat the enemy but to send a message through violent acts of symbolic significance that gains maximum attention to a cause.⁵

Cindy Combs refers to terrorism as "a synthesis of war and theatre: a dramatization of violence which is perpetrated on innocent victims and played before an audience in the hope of creating a mode of fear without apology or remorse for political purposes."⁶ And Bruce Hoffman, one of the most internationally-respected scholars in this field, defines terrorism as "the deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through violence or the threat of violence in the pursuit of political change ... [it is] designed to have far-reaching psychological effects beyond the immediate victim(s) or object of the terrorist attack ... [and] to create power where there is none or to consolidate power where there is very little."⁷ Hoffman also notes that certain aspects

of various terrorism definitions are fundamental. For example, most definitions of terrorism include some political dimension (as demonstrated by many of the authors I have just mentioned), usually a desire for political change. However, some terrorist groups are motivated by a desire to prevent political change and preserve the status quo. (We'll talk more about those kinds of groups in Lecture 12.) Further, states can also terrorize their citizens, and when this happens it's usually the case that political change is not desired.

Fundamental to most descriptions and definitions of terrorism is the notion that those who engage in it do not abide by conventional norms of political violence—rather, they intentionally target innocents (including off-duty military, law enforcement or other government officials), and they seek to cause psychological trauma as much as (if not more than) death and damage. And of course, there are also criminal dimensions to terrorism as well. Terrorists kill, maim and destroy, and it would be difficult to find a court of law anywhere in the civilized world that does not view these as crimes, regardless of motives or ultimate goals. Further, terrorists have also routinely engaged in money laundering, theft, fraud, extortion, smuggling (including drugs, weapons, and humans), bank robbery and many other kinds of criminal activity.

Alex Schmid, another internationally respected senior scholar in this field, notes that criminal and terrorist organizations have much in common: both are rational actors, they produce victims, they use similar tactics such as kidnapping and assassination, they operate secretly, and both are criminalized by the ruling regime and stand in opposition to the state.⁸ However, in most definitions of terrorism, a common theme is that *motives matter*. For example, organizational crime expert Phil Williams distinguishes terrorist and criminal organizations by their motives: at the heart of terrorist organizations is the desire to bring about (or prevent) political change, while criminal organizations focus on profit generation and maximization.⁹ Further, terrorist attacks should be seen as a sum total of activities that include fundraising, recruitment, training, development of special skills and preparation for an attack which can stretch over several months or even years. Criminal organizations focus much of their energies on protecting themselves from peer competitors or government and law enforcement agencies, and pursue strategies to manage, avoid, control or mitigate risk—but of course, many terrorist groups do this as well.¹⁰ For the most part, the one aspect that distinguishes terrorists from other criminals is the political nature of the violence they inflict. Many see terrorism as the use or threat of

violence to bring about change, and most often the kind of change terrorists seek is political in one way or another.

You can also see clear distinctions between terrorists and criminals in how they view money. As Loretta Napoleani notes, criminal organizations run their operations like private corporations, with the accumulation of profit as the ultimate goal. In contrast, terrorist organizations are more interested in money disbursements than money laundering; instead of accumulation and profit maximization, money is to be distributed within the network of cells to support operations.¹¹ Overall, while terrorism is often considered a form of political violence, it is also seen by law enforcement professionals as a unique form of violent crime—unique primarily because of the motives behind it. However, a growing number of authors have also begun to suggest that the distinctions between organized crime and terrorism may be fading. For example, Walter Laqueur has argued that fifty years ago a clear dividing line existed between terrorism and organized crime, but that “more recently this line has become blurred, and in some cases a symbiosis between terrorism and organized crime has occurred that did not exist before.”¹² Other scholars have described the phenomenon as a nexus, a confluence, a continuum or some other kind of paradigm involving fluid, constantly changing relationships among members of terrorist and criminal networks.¹³ We’ll discuss more about these evolving changes in the world of terrorism later in this lecture series.

In the late 1980s, Schmid and several of his European colleagues conducted a study involving hundreds of publications about terrorism, and found a number of common themes, shown in Table 1. Based on this research, they offered a definition that attempts to capture most of what the scholarly community seems to agree on in its use of the term:

Terrorism is an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by (semi-) clandestine individual, group or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal or political reasons, whereby—in contrast to assassination—the direct targets of violence are not the main targets. The immediate human victims of violence are generally chosen randomly (targets of opportunity) or selectively (representative or symbolic targets) from a target population, and serve as message generators. Threat- and violence-based communication processes between terrorist (organization), (imperiled) victims, and main targets are used to manipulate the main target (audience(s)), turning it into a target of terror, a target of demands, or a target of attention, depending on whether intimidation, coercion, or propaganda is primarily sought.¹⁴

Table 1: Frequency of definitional elements in the study of terrorism

Concept/theme	How often it was part of definition (%)	Concept/theme	How often it was part of definition (%)
Violence, force	83.5	Arbitrariness; impersonal, random character	21%
Political	65	Civilians, noncombatants, neutrals, outsiders as victims	17.5
Fear, terror emphasized	51	Intimidation	17
Threat	47	Innocence of victims emphasized	15.5
Psychological effects and anticipated reactions	41.5	Group, movement, organization as perpetrator	14
Victim-target differentiation	37.5	Symbolic aspect, demonstration to others	13.5
Purposive, planned, systematic, organized action	32	Incalculability, unpredictability, unexpectedness of occurrence of violence	9
Method of combat, strategy, tactic	30.5	Clandestine, covert nature	9
Extranormality, in breach of accepted rules, without humanitarian constraints	30	Repetitiveness; serial or campaign character of violence	7
Coercion, extortion, induction of compliance	28	Criminal	6
Public aspect	21.5	Demands made on third parties	4

Source: Alex P. Schmid, Albert J. Jongman, et al. *Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories, and Literature* (Amsterdam: North Holland, Transaction Books, 1988), p. 5-6.

To me, this is a nice way of comprehensively representing the vast scholarship in the study of terrorism. Unfortunately, it is a bit too long and complicated to deliver in a standard classroom lecture. So, in my introductory lectures on terrorism, I typically draw on some version of the following as a working definition:

Terrorism is a combination of strategies and violent tactics in which the victims (e.g., ordinary citizens) are a sub-element of a broader target (e.g., a government). These strategies and tactics are used by individuals or groups in pursuit of some type of objectives—typically of a political, social, criminal, economic and/or religious nature—and they perceive terrorism to be the most effective way to *obtain the power* needed to achieve those objectives.

Essentially, this definition reflects my own thinking that terrorism is to some degree a product of a basic unequal distribution of power on local, national, or global levels. This admittedly simplistic view of terrorism is underscored by a much broader and more important basic issue: the choice to engage in terrorism is driven by a belief that the present is inadequate, and thus something must be done in order to ensure a better future.

Thus, from political revolutionaries to religious militants, the results are similar in terms of their adoption of politically violent tactics as a means to achieve their objectives. Dissatisfaction with the status quo has led to terrorist group formation in Ireland, Italy, Egypt, Germany, Sri Lanka, Japan, Indonesia, the Philippines, the United States, and many other nations. Moreover, terrorism has proven effective in bringing about change, from the perspective of some observers. For example, terrorism drove the powerful United States (and later Israel) out of Lebanon, and convinced the French to pull out of Algeria. To understand terrorism requires, at some level, an ability to consider how terrorists view themselves and how they rationalize their behavior.

In many cases, individuals who carry out acts of terrorism are consumed by hatred towards others, and display a willingness and ability to kill without remorse or regard for those who may die from their terrorist acts. A good deal of this animosity—particularly in the developing world—may stem from a perception that they have been victimized by corrupt governments, backed by powerful nations and multinational corporations, that have little concern for their lives, needs, or suffering. This results in widespread perceptions of helplessness (again, a lack of power) and hate which can lay the groundwork for terrorist recruitment. However,

it can also be said that hatred in the soul of the terrorist is a symptom of something deeper, a central dissatisfaction with one's place in this world vis-à-vis others, as I discuss in Lectures 4 through 9.

The unequal distribution of power feeds a perception of “us versus them,” a perception found in all ideologies associated with politically violent groups

and movements. From William Potter Gale's rabid white supremacy radio shows in the United States to the firebrand imams in the mosques of Riyadh or Finsbury Park, London, the hardships and challenges “we” face can be framed in terms of what “they” are, or (more likely) what “they” have done to “us.” From this perspective, “we” desire a redistribution of power in order to have more control over our destiny, and one could argue that many terrorist groups use violence as the way to bring this about.

A cursory look at the stated objectives of some of the world's more notorious terrorist groups exemplifies this view. Ethnic separatist groups like the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE, in Sri Lanka), the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG, in the Philippines), and the Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (Basque Fatherland and Liberty, or ETA, in Spain) all want the power to form their own recognized, sovereign entity, carved out of an existing nation-state. Groups engaged in the Middle East intifada—like the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and the Palestine Liberation Front—want the power to establish an Islamic Palestinian state. Other groups want the power to establish an Islamic state in their own region, including Ansar al-Islam (in Iraq), the Armed Islamic Group (in Algeria), al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya (in Egypt), the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (in Central Asia), and Jemaah Islamiyah (in Southeast Asia). In all cases, these groups seek the power to change the status quo, to forge a future that they do not believe will come about naturally, and are determined to use terrorism to achieve their objectives.

The pursuit of power to control resources can be seen in many terrorist campaigns. In seeking the power to decide what to do with a country's natural endowment—including land, oil, diamonds, water, etc.—some have resorted to terrorism as a tactic for compelling others into reluctant agreement with their preferred agenda. We've seen this kind of violence most recently in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria. Land

TO THE POINT

Terrorists want the power to achieve their objectives.

is another important finite resource and source of conflict; indeed, a relatively tiny strip of land plays a key role in the deadly Middle East conflict. Both Palestinians and Jews focus on the “occupation” of “our land” by the other. Zionist groups complain about the “evil forces who have become stronger in our Holy Land,”¹⁵ while Palestinians focus on a history of Israeli forces entering villages and driving entire populations out into what became the refugee settlements in Gaza, the West Bank, Lebanon, Egypt, Jordan and elsewhere.

Further, throughout its history, terrorism has been used (by both Muslims and Jewish extremists) to disrupt the Middle East peace process. For example, Israel’s Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin was assassinated by Yigal Amir, a Jewish ultra-Orthodox student, because of Rabin’s plan to evacuate a small settler enclave in Hebron as part of the Oslo Accords he signed with Yassir Arafat in 1993. In essence, terrorist acts in this region are most often carried out by the relatively powerless, seeking ways to shape the course of future events that concern them, especially when these events concern a bit of highly coveted land. Further, the crisis in the Middle East can be seen overall as a struggle over the power of the Palestinian people to govern themselves within territorial boundaries defined by them, and the power of the Israelis to enjoy security and prosperity within territorial borders they define for themselves.

In sum, terrorism can be seen from one point of view as a combination of strategies and tactics used in the pursuit of power to achieve some form of political, social, criminal, economic, religious or other objective. At a most basic level, those with a comparatively greater position of power over others and over their own future typically have little incentive to use terrorism to achieve their goals. When one has power, one’s goals can be achieved through other means. But the relatively powerless, engaged in a struggle with the powerful over resources, political and economic decisions, and the shape of their future, may resort to terrorism as a primary way to influence the evolution of history.

From this perspective, it is intuitive to suggest that only through the global spread of democracy—in which all groups, large and small, have equal opportunity to influence the course of future events—will we ever find a way to bring about the decline of terrorism. However, democracies require compromise, and it is here that the argument hits a stumbling block: in true democracies, small groups—particularly those with relatively unpopular social, political or religious agendas—are often unable to achieve their objectives, and a willingness to compromise may

not be among their core values in the first place.

This is a particularly worrisome factor in today's era of sacred terror, where terrorism is being used as a tactic for achieving an ideologically absolutist agenda without regard for the niceties of diplomatic negotiation or democratic compromise. For example, for nearly three decades the United States has suffered numerous terrorist attacks by the Army of God, a loose underground network of Christian extremists committed to attacking abortion clinics and doctors. Members of this group are absolutely convinced that God wants them to use violence “in defense of the unborn child” and in this sense are not much different from the jihadists of al-Qaeda who are absolutely

convinced God wants them to use violence “in defense of the *umma* [global Muslim community].” In both cases, a negotiated settlement to their grievances seems virtually impossible. We'll examine this critical challenge of modern terrorism at several points throughout this lecture series.



Figure 1: The World Trade Center towers in New York City being struck by hijacked aircraft on September 11, 2001, attacks. Source: Flickr user Robert (TheMachineShop)

THE STUDY OF TERRORISM

Obviously, the study of terrorism can get very complicated and confusing, especially because there are so many different kinds of terrorist groups, and gaining a solid understanding of each one requires studying the specific context from which it emerged. In short, there is no easy way to simplify the study of terrorism. In my courses on terrorism, as reflected in this book of lectures, most of my lessons focus

on either attributes of the groups, or attributes of the environment in which they operate.¹⁶ I also begin each semester with a review of key terms that one finds prominently in the terrorism studies literature. A handful of these are highlighted in bold type throughout this book. A glossary and additional online materials, are available at: www.TerrorismLectures.com.

Attributes of Terrorist Organizations

When describing a typical terrorist organization, I usually begin with a look at what seems to motivate all terrorists: a **vision**. Terrorism is most often fueled by an individual's or group's vision of the future, a future which they believe cannot be achieved without resorting to violence. Further, as I mentioned a moment ago, individuals who embrace this kind of vision do not believe they have the **power** to bring about change or a vision of the future *without* resorting to violence. In some instances, terrorism is used in an attempt to gain the power to impact the policies of a government, or to decide the fate of a certain piece of land.

When a terrorist group describes its grievances and a strategy through which they can be addressed, we generally refer to this as the group's **ideology**. These terrorist group ideologies typically call for the use of various forms of violent action in the pursuit of objectives like establishing a utopian political system, religious governance, or an independent geopolitical entity based on ethnic identity. There are four primary types of terrorist ideologies which represent the majority of terrorist groups that have existed over the past century: ethnonationalist/separatist, left-wing, right-wing, and religious.¹⁷

Ethnonationalist terrorist groups usually have clear territorial objectives, like the liberation of a particular region of a country from a government that they view as oppressive and illegitimate. Groups in this category may draw their support from those who share their ethnic/racial background, even if they live elsewhere. Examples include the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka, the ETA in Spain, the PKK in Turkey, the Irish Republican Army, Chechens in Russia and various Kashmir separatist groups. We'll focus on groups like these in Lecture 10.

Left-wing terrorists are usually driven by liberal or idealist political concepts that are anti-authoritarian, revolutionary, and sometimes anti-materialist. Groups in this category have typically targeted elites (business, government, etc.) who symbolize authority. Some examples include the Red Brigades of Italy, the Red Army Faction in Germany (also known as the Baader-Meinhof Gang), and Sendero Luminoso in

Peru. We'll focus on groups like these in Lecture 11.

Next there are the **right-wing** terrorists, whose violence is usually aimed against individuals of a particular race or ethnicity, and may be in reaction to perceived threats to the status quo. Examples include various white supremacist groups as well as certain groups that mix a religious (sometimes anti-Semitic) dimension with racial supremacy. We'll focus on groups like these in Lecture 12.

Finally, the largest proportion of active terrorist groups today adhere to some kind of **religious-oriented** ideology. Among the ideological categories that describe modern terrorism, religious ideologies are unique for many reasons. First, they provide a long-term view of history and the future, meaning that adherents come to believe they are taking part in an epic battle of good versus evil. Piety and persistence in the faith will give you the strength to overcome anything, and will lead to rewards in this life and the next (including for your family). Religious ideologies also draw on a common reliance on individuals with special intellectual gifts for interpreting sacred texts (imams, clergy, etc.)—individuals who provide meaning for those seeking enlightenment, or who are pursuing an understanding of “what God wants from me.” This, in turn, means extremist religious leaders have a particular opportunity to exploit the need of some people for religious guidance. Doing the bidding of a higher power demands sacrifice but also means fewer limits on violence. It's easier to kill if you think you're doing God's will—violence is seen as necessary in order to save oneself, one's family or even the world. Examples of religiously-oriented terrorist groups include Hizballah, Hamas, al-Qaeda and its various affiliates, Jewish/Zionist extremists, and some Christian extremist groups in the United States and Europe. We'll focus on groups like these in Lecture 13.

Of course, there are several other types of terrorist groups as well, like anarchists, violent environmentalists (including the Earth Liberation Front) and animal rights extremists (including the Animal Liberation Front). And it should be remembered that several groups have drawn on ideological combinations (for example, a combination of right-wing and religious ideologies, or of left-wing and ethnonationalist ideologies). But the important point to make here is that a terrorist group's ideological orientation determines the kinds of members and funding they can attract, their strategic and tactical decisions, and of course the kinds of things they hope to achieve through their use of violence. For example, Army of God members attack abortion clinics and doctors, animal rights extremists attack laboratories, and Palestinian groups attack Israeli targets. Table 2 offers a brief

Table 2: Partial list of the world's most active terrorist groups

Group	Brief Description
Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)	Violent Islamist group founded in the early 1990s in southern Philippines; responsible for kidnappings and bombings
Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade (AAMS)	Palestinian nationalist group founded in the early 2000s; responsible for several suicide bombings against Israelis
Al-Qaeda (AQ)	Global jihadist terrorists with a “base” in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region; group wants to re-establish an Islamic caliphate through the use of terrorism on a global scale
Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)	Local affiliate of global AQ jihadist movement in Yemen; linked to several recent terrorist plots against the United States
Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (formerly GSPC)	Local affiliate of global AQ jihadist movement in Algeria and North Africa; responsible for several recent kidnappings
Al-Shabaab	Violent Islamist group in Somalia founded in the late 2000s; has used suicide bombings against civilian targets
Aum Shinrikyo (AUM)	Japanese cult responsible for 1995 sarin nerve agent attack on the Tokyo subway
Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA)	Ethnonationalist group in northern Spain and southern France, founded in the late 1950s; linked to bombings and assassinations over several decades. They renounced violence in 2011
Continuity Irish Republican Army (CIRA)	Ethnonationalist group founded in mid-1980s in Northern Ireland; dissident Republican group with few members
Hamas (Islamic Resistance Movement)	Violent Islamist and ethnonationalist group founded in the late 1980s in the Palestinian Territories; responsible for many suicide bombings and rocket attacks; has members in the Palestinian Parliament
Hizballah (Party of God)	Shiite Islamist group founded in Lebanon in the early 1980s; responsible for many suicide bombings; has members in senior positions throughout the government
Islamic State (IS)	Sunni militant group active in Syria and Iraq; created from remnants of Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI); also known as ISIS or ISIL
Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM) (Army of Mohammed)	Violent Islamist and ethnonationalist group formed in Pakistan in the early 2000s; wants to unite Kashmir with Pakistan; also attacks foreign troops in Afghanistan
Jemaah Islamiya organization (JI)	Violent Islamist group founded in Indonesia during the mid-1990s; responsible for several major bombings; wants to establish an Islamic state in Southeast Asia

Group	Brief Description
Kahane Chai (Kach)	Zionist and racist terrorist group in Israel founded in the early 1990s; advocates killing or expelling all Arabs from the Palestinian Territories
Kongra-Gel (KGK, formerly Kurdistan Workers' Party, PKK, KADEK)	Ethnonationalist Kurdish group founded in the early 2000s with fighters in southern Turkey as well as parts of Iraq, Syria and Iran; wants to establish a Kurdish state
Lashkar-e Tayyiba (LT) (Army of the Righteous)	Violent Islamist and ethnonationalist group founded in the 1990s; wants to unite Kashmir with Pakistan; responsible for several terrorist attacks in India
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)	Ethnonationalist Tamil group founded in Sri Lanka during the mid-1960s; pioneered suicide bombing tactics throughout the 1990s; militarily defeated in 2009
National Liberation Army (ELN)	Left-wing Marxist revolutionary group in Colombia; founded in the mid-1960s; very active in kidnapping and extortions
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)	Left-wing Marxist revolutionary group in the Palestinian Territories; founded in the late 1960s
Real IRA (RIRA)	Ethnonationalist group in Northern Ireland; dissident Republican group with few members; founded in the late 1990s; responsible for the 1998 Omagh bombing
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)	Originally Marxist revolutionary group founded in Colombia during the mid-1960s; focused more today on drug trafficking than political agenda
Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso, SL)	Left-wing Marxist revolutionary group from Peru founded in the late 1960s
Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP)	Also known as the "Pakistani Taliban," founded in the late 2000s; promotes attacks against Pakistan and NATO-led forces in Afghanistan; took credit for 2010 attempted terrorist attack in Times Square in New York City

Source: Bureau of Counterterrorism, U.S. State Department, "Current List of Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations" (January 27, 2012); The Center for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), "Terrorist Organization Profiles" database; and the National Counterterrorism Center "Terrorist Groups" descriptions.

glimpse at the most active terrorist groups in the world today, many of which will be described in greater detail throughout this book.

Typically, a terrorist group's ideology will try to convince you that you have a **duty** to do something in support of their vision of the future—from providing financial or material support, to the most extreme **self-sacrifice** of so-called **martyrdom** (note that the term “martyrs” has been used by Catholics in Ireland, Buddhists in Sri Lanka, and the anti-abortion movement in the United States, as well as by Islamist extremists in the Middle East and elsewhere). Terrorism is seen by these groups as a **strategy** to achieve the objectives described in their ideology, while terrorist-related **tactics** can include a fairly broad range of violence, from suicide bombings or even the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), to kidnappings and beheadings, to flying passenger airplanes into tall buildings.

The ways in which the terrorist group mobilizes people and convinces them to support their strategy and tactics is often referred to as **radicalization**. Often, according to Stanford University psychologist Albert Bandura, this radicalization will involve a form of **moral disengagement**, a multi-step psychological process that members of terrorist groups often go through.¹⁸ First, the new recruit must acquire an ability to sanctify violence as honorable and righteous. They must also learn to minimize the consequences of violence, including the murder of others. This disregard for consequences makes it easier for a new terrorist recruit to hurt or kill innocent civilians in pursuit of the larger political objective. And finally, Bandura notes that people find violence easier if they don't consider their victims as human beings.

Of course, it's not enough to develop a desire to be a terrorist—you also have to develop the skill to pull that trigger, manufacture that bomb, and so forth. We'll talk some more about this particular type of terrorist learning in Lecture 3, but an important thing to keep in mind here is that many terrorist organizations have shown the attributes of **learning organizations**—that is, they scan the environment, look for vulnerabilities in their enemies, examine successful terrorist practices of other groups, and incorporate this new knowledge into their own operations. Understanding this helps us avoid underestimating the capabilities of terrorists.

Terrorism is also considered by military and security specialists as a form of **asymmetric warfare** (AW) or **unconventional warfare** (UW) involving non-uniformed combatants. Earlier in this lecture, I described terrorism as a distinct form of **political violence** (as distinguished from criminally-oriented violence)

involving attacks in which the killing of civilians is not really the primary objective. That is, when that car bomb explodes in Baghdad, the primary objective is not only or primarily just to kill a group of people. Instead, the terrorist group seeks to affect public opinion (including confidence in the government's ability to provide security); they want to communicate a sense of power to their supporters and their enemies, and often motivate new recruits or supporters to join their cause. From this perspective, terrorist attacks have also been described as **communicative acts**—in other words, the violent attacks are meant to communicate certain messages to various audiences, including enemies, supporters, potential supporters and constituents, and so forth.

Many terrorist groups try to portray themselves as a **vanguard**, leading the way in liberating an oppressed people toward a better future. Their ideologies typically argue that they alone recognize the “**truth**” and because of this knowledge they are motivated to carry out violent terrorist actions. In some cases, like the white supremacist movement in the United States during the 1980s, and more recently the global al-Qaeda Salafi-jihadist movement, the ideology is intended to promote a “**leaderless resistance**” campaign of terrorism, through which violent acts are carried out in support of the overall vision and goals, but without any formal group structure. As we'll discuss in Lecture 12, white supremacists in the United States developed this concept loosely, and al-Qaeda has expanded it to promote a virtual “leaderless jihad” in which individuals can contribute to the cause by any means available to them, including orchestrating their own terrorist attacks on behalf of al-Qaeda with no direct ties to any formal al-Qaeda leaders or affiliated cells. We will examine al-Qaeda's version of leaderless resistance more in Lectures 13 through 15.

Finally, when describing terrorism in general I sometimes use the term **psychological warfare**, which according to the U.S. Department of Defense involves actions that are meant to influence the emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and, ultimately, the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups and individuals. From the perspective of terrorists or insurgents engaged in asymmetric warfare against a government, a major target of these operations will be the population's support of its government. Thus, terrorism requires an ability to influence beliefs, an area of activity that I call **influence warfare**, which will be the focus of Lecture 5.

Attributes of the Terrorist Groups' Operating Environments

While the study of terrorism is focused quite a lot on the groups themselves, there is also an important area of research which looks at the environments in which these groups emerge and sustain themselves. For many years now, my own research in this area has examined the nature of ideological resonance, a term which describes the degree to which members of a particular population find a terrorist group's ideology appealing. A resonating ideology can influence an individual's willingness to embrace terrorism as a reasonable course of action, and is essential for the success of any terrorist group or movement; if their vision of the future appeals to nobody, there will be no radicalization, no financial support or recruitment, and the group will die on the vine.

To understand why a terrorist group's ideology resonates, we have to examine the kind of political, social, economic, religious or other insecurities and **grievances** that a local population may have and that are used by the terrorist group to rationalize the use of violent acts. We will cover these in depth in Lectures 4 through 9, but to give just a summary here, an ideology may resonate among a particular community due to a broad range of political issues like incompetent, authoritarian or corrupt governments, as well as economic issues like widespread poverty or unemployment. In many instances, the political and socioeconomic grievances that lead to terrorism are tied to a government's **legitimacy**, or lack thereof. As Ted Robert Gurr has noted, the legitimacy of a government can be severely undermined by a range of things, like widespread injustice or a major gap between the aspirations of a population and the opportunities for them to achieve those aspirations.¹⁹

Political repression is clearly an important structural element beneath the unequal distribution of power I described earlier. When a government exhibits outright hostility and commits open violence against members of its citizenry, this represents a form of the powerful subjugating the relatively powerless. Many corrupt governments around the world seek to maintain and increase their power over others (and over resources) by any means necessary, while the powerless see the corruption and look for ways to combat it—even through violent acts of terrorism. In essence, when a government fails to uphold a fair and honest social contract between governor and the governed, its citizens become angry and may often seek the power to force change; this, in turn, has led to a variety of revolutionary and terrorist movements throughout history.

Some of the literature in the field of terrorism studies has used terms like **root**

causes to describe these and other kinds of grievances, but in my view the overall root cause of terrorism is an individual's decision to pull that trigger, detonate that bomb, and so forth. Further, poverty and unemployment, for example, don't "cause" terrorism. Actually, most of the research on so-called root causes really just seeks to find meaningful relationships between certain historical, cultural, economic and sociopolitical characteristics of the larger society and the occurrence of terrorism. These characteristics could help create an **enabling environment** for a terrorist group to capitalize on what Harvard University psychologist John Mack describes as "a reservoir of misery, hurt, helplessness and rage from which the foot soldiers of terrorism can be recruited."²⁰

Other so-called "root causes" are actually **facilitators** of terrorism, and can include things like easy access to weapons, financial support and safe haven. Weak or **failed states** can also facilitate terrorism, particularly in places where the government's authority is routinely challenged and undermined by a variety of violent non-state actors.²¹ These are countries in which a weak central government is unable to provide adequate **human security** to all segments of its population can also serve as a conduit for radicalization and terrorism.²² In weak states, the absence of rule of law or peaceful ways to resolve conflict can lead those seeking power to use violent means to achieve their objectives. In many weak states, where security can be readily purchased by the highest bidder, the powerful do what they want, while the powerless are made to do their bidding.

The challenge of state weakness is now explicitly recognized in U.S. national security circles as a strategic problem almost equal in importance to state competitors. As the 2002 *National Security Strategy of the United States* notes, "America is now threatened less by conquering states than we are by failing ones."²³ The 2015 *National Security Strategy* echoes this by emphasizing the "security consequences associated with weak or failing states." It is no coincidence that a significant number of terrorist plots and attacks against the United States and its allies have been linked to places like Yemen, Somalia and Afghanistan. These are also the same kind of environments in which we find a strong presence of organized criminal networks, which I'll talk more about in Lecture 8.

Finally, the ability for a society to resist and deflect the terrorist group's efforts to coerce their behavior and beliefs depends largely on its **resilience** in the face of violent attacks or the continual threats thereof. While the complex topic of countering terrorism will be addressed in a different volume of lectures (forthcoming), it is

important to mention this resilience issue here because it is one of the fundamental challenges that a terrorist group faces when trying to achieve its objectives.

SUMMARY

To sum up this introductory lecture, defining terrorism is clearly not a simple, straightforward task. As we delve deeper into the contested terrain of terrorism studies, you will be encouraged to formulate your own personal definition and description of terrorism. Further, the study of terrorism has become more complicated than in decades past. Because of the global nature of transportation, financial and communication networks, and media, terrorists can now wage campaigns on a global scale, particularly if they effectively exploit new communications technologies like the Internet. During the 1980s and 90s, terrorist group recruiters would use CDs and DVDs as part of their indoctrination efforts. However, they still relied largely on conventional media to get national or international news coverage of the attacks they conducted. The Internet changed all that, through the ease of distributing videos—even of nearly real-time events—worldwide. Further, the Internet has enabled a whole new kind of intelligence gathering among terrorists, particularly in open societies—they can monitor changes in government security procedures (including information on what airport screeners might be looking for), gather details of transit systems or important government buildings, and get information on how the public is responding to terrorist attacks or the government's response. We'll take a closer look at the relationship between terrorism and the Internet in Lecture 6.

However, amid the many changes we have seen over the years, a fundamental element of modern terrorism is really not all that new: taking instruments from our daily life—the backpack, the car, the shoe, the cell phone—and turning them into weapons. The overall goal here is to damage the trust necessary for a successful open society. We find ourselves looking suspiciously at someone wearing a backpack on a subway train; we have to remove our shoes at airport checkpoints; we can buy cell phones in a convenience store that can be used as a bomb detonator. And while the typical Hollywood portrayal of a terrorist is a wide-eyed, crazy-haired male between the ages of 18 and 35, the reality is much different: terrorist groups have been increasingly using women and even children to carry out their lethal attacks. There is no real 'profile' of a terrorist. As we'll discuss in Lecture 5, potentially anyone can be radicalized, indoctrinated, and taught why and how to murder others in pursuit

of some broader vision. This is a key challenge for confronting terrorism in today's world.

Overall, there is clearly much to study in the world of terrorism, including the characteristics of terrorist groups and those who join them, which is what we'll look at in the next couple of lectures and in Part III of this volume. We also have to look beyond violent actions and goals, to include the role of perceptions and beliefs that sustain terrorists' ideological resonance, as we'll discuss in Lectures 4 and 5. But first, in the next lecture, we'll take a brief look at the history of modern terrorism.

QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION

- What are the most central elements to any definition of terrorism?
- Why are there so many different definitions of terrorism?
- Why is there not even a common definition across all U.S. organizations?
- What is the nature of terrorist strategy and how should we think about this category of political violence?

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- **National Institute of Justice:**
<http://nij.gov/topics/crime/terrorism/welcome.htm>
- **Perspectives on Terrorism:**
<http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt>
- **Sentinel—a journal by the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point:**
<http://www.ctc.usma.edu/publications/sentinel>
- **START Terrorist Group Profiles:**
http://www.start.umd.edu/start/data_collections/tops/

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NOTES

1. 22 United States Code, Section 2656 (d)-cit. *United States Department Patterns of Global Terrorism*, 1999 (Washington D.C.: Dept. of State Publication, April 2000), p. viii.

2. See the National Institute of Justice website on terrorism, at: <http://nij.gov/topics/crime/terrorism/welcome.htm>

3. However, Charles Tilly also asserts that terror denotes a conflict strategy that may pursue a “distinct extra-political goal.” See Charles Tilly, “Violence, Terror, and Politics as Usual,” *Boston Review* 27, no. 3-4 (2002).

4. David C. Rapoport, “Before the Bombs There Were the Mobs: American Experiences with Terror,” *Terrorism and Political Violence* 20, no. 2 (2008), footnote 12.

5. Louise Richardson, *What Terrorists Want* (New York: Random House, 2007), pp. 4-5.

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8. Alex P. Schmid, “The Links between Transnational Organized Crime and Terrorist Crimes,” *Transnational Organized Crime* 2, no. 2 (1996), pp. 66-7.

9. Phil Williams, “Strategy for a New World: Combating Terrorism and Transnational Organized Crime,” in *Strategy in the Contemporary World*, edited by John Baylis, et al. (Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 195-6.

10. Ibid., p. 196.

11. Loretta Napoleoni, “The New Economy of Terror: How Terrorism is Financed,” *Forum on Crime and Society* 4, nos. 1 and 2 (2004), pp. 31-3.

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14. Alex P. Schmid, Albert J. Jongman, et al., *Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories, and Literature* (Amsterdam: Transaction Books, 1988), pp. 5-6.

15. See Allan C. Brownfeld, “Religious Zionism: A Growing Impediment To Middle East Peace,” *Washington Report on Middle East Affairs* 21, no. 9 (2002), p. 71.

16. I also teach courses on counterterrorism. Lectures from those courses are forthcoming.

17. For descriptions of these and other terrorist ideological categories, along with profiles of groups that are typically categorized within each, see the Terrorist Organization Profiles website at <http://goo.gl/416or>

18. See Albert Bandura, “Training for Terrorism through Selective Moral Disengagement,” in *The Making of a Terrorist* (vol. 2), edited by James J. F. Forest (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2005), pp. 34-50.

19. Ted Robert Gurr, *Why Men Rebel* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970)

20. John E. Mack, “Deeper Causes: Exploring the Role of Consciousness in Terrorism,” *Ions Noetic Sciences Review* (2003), p. 13.

21. See James J. F. Forest and Matthew V. Sousa, *Oil and Terrorism in the New Gulf* (Lanham, MD: Lexington, 2006), particularly Chapters 3, 4 and 9.

22. For more on the relationship between human security and terrorism, please see Cindy R. Jebb and Madelfia A. Abb, “Human Security and Good Governance: A Living Systems Approach to Understanding and Combating Terrorism,” in *The Making of a Terrorist* (vol. 3), edited by James J. F. Forest (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2005).

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